

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Robert H. Green,)	C/A No.: 1:21-3259-JFA-SVH
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
v.)	
)	ORDER AND NOTICE
Major Vaughn, Sheriff Chad)	
McBride, A. Belk, and T. Kerr,)	
)	
Defendants.)	
)	

Robert H. Green (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights while incarcerated at the Anderson County Detention Center. He sues Major Vaughn, Sheriff Chad McBride, A. Belk, and T. Kerr (collectively “Defendants”). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge.

I. Factual Background

In the form complaint Plaintiff completed, in the section in which he is instructed to explain how each defendant is liable, he states: “Fire hazard, medical malpractice, deliberate indifference, cruel and unusual punishment, unsanitary conditions, negligence, over population.” [ECF No. 1 at 4]. When

asked to state the facts of his case, Plaintiff states “I contracted staph infections, rashes, illnesses, and Covid-19 without medical care. No sprinkler system in jail. Building not in code or ordinance. Over-crowdedness.” *Id.* at 5. Plaintiff states he requests the following relief: “Building to be in code. New facility, damages. Defendants to be held accountable, corrected or to be released.” *Id.*¹

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A

¹ In the cover letter to his complaint, Plaintiff requests his complaint be filed with three other complaints as a class action. Plaintiff may not represent other inmates in a class action and may not litigate on behalf of other persons. *See Oxendine v. Williams*, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he competence of a layman representing himself [is] clearly too limited to allow him to risk the rights of others.”); *see also Hummer v. Dalton*, 657 F.2d 621, 625–26 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that a pro se prisoner’s suit is “confined to redress for violation of his own personal rights and not one by him as a knight-errant for all prisoners”); *C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States*, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting while a non-attorney may represent himself, he has no authority to appear as an attorney for others).

finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). *See Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff’s allegations are assumed to be true. *Fine v. City of N.Y.*, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.*, 901 F.2d 387, 390–91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a

claim. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009); *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

B. Analysis

1. Insufficient Allegations

To state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,² an aggrieved party must sufficiently allege that he was injured by “the deprivation of any [of his or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws” by a “person” acting “under color of state law.” *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1983; *see generally* 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 1230 (3d ed. 2014). To assert a viable § 1983 claim against a state official, Plaintiff must allege a causal connection or affirmative link between the conduct of which he complains and the official sued. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (providing that

² Plaintiff’s complaint is before this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is the procedural mechanism through which Congress provided a private civil cause of action based on allegations of federal constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their *federally-guaranteed* rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.

a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead that the defendant, through his own individual actions, violated the Constitution). Plaintiff asserts no factual allegations against Defendants, and their names are not used beyond being listed on the first few pages of the complaint. Therefore, this case is subject to summary dismissal.

2. Conclusory Claims

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009); *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678–79. Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations of constitutional wrongdoing or discriminatory actions attributable to Defendants.

3. No Supervisory Liability Under § 1983

The doctrine of supervisory liability is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of his

employees, absent an official policy or custom that results in illegal action. *See Monell v. Department of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); *Fisher v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority*, 690 F.2d 1133, 1142–43 (4th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court explains that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to *Bivens* and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 676; *see Slakan v. Porter*, 737 F.2d 368, 372–74 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding officials may be held liable for the acts of their subordinates, if the official is aware of a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm from a specified source and fails to take corrective action as a result of deliberate indifference or tacit authorization). Because Plaintiff fails to allege any specific actions or inactions against any defendant, they are entitled to summary dismissal.


NOTICE CONCERNING AMENDMENT

Plaintiff may attempt to correct the defects in his complaint by filing an amended complaint by **October 25, 2021**, along with any appropriate service documents. Plaintiff is reminded an amended complaint replaces the original complaint and should be complete in itself. *See Young v. City of Mount Ranier*, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001) (“As a general rule, an amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If Plaintiff files an amended complaint,

the undersigned will conduct screening of the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or fails to cure the deficiencies identified above, the undersigned will recommend to the district court that the claims specified above be dismissed without leave for further amendment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

October 13, 2021
Columbia, South Carolina



Shiva V. Hodges
United States Magistrate Judge